

INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND REQUIRED DISCLOSURES

Policy Statement

KSU faculty and staff researchers must disclose all foreign relationships and activities.

Background

Kennesaw State University recognizes that collaboration with parties external to KSU is an essential part of research and encourages its researchers to engage in such collaborations to advance scientific inquiry and discovery. Collaboration with foreign entities and funding agencies carries the potential risk of undue foreign influence on federally funded research, making it imperative that KSU faculty disclose all such collaborations. The Department of Defense (DoD), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Department of Energy (DoE) have all issued statements about the necessity of disclosing foreign relationships and activities.

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2019 directed the Secretary of Defense to work with academic institutions to “limit undue influence, including through foreign talent programs, by countries to exploit United States technology within the Department of Defense research, science and technology, and innovation enterprise.”¹

[NIH notice NOT-OD-19-114](#), issued July 10, 2019, reminds researchers and academic institutions “about the need to report foreign activities through documentation of other support, foreign components, and financial conflict of interest to prevent scientific, budgetary, or commitment overlap.”

NSF issued a [Dear Colleague](#) letter on July 11, 2019 about emerging risks to the US research ecosystem: “Our science and engineering enterprise ... is put at risk when other governments endeavor to benefit from the global research ecosystem without upholding the values of openness, transparency, and reciprocal collaboration.” Since 1978, NSF has required senior project personnel on proposals to disclose all sources of support, foreign and domestic. As part of an effort to ensure that this requirement is understood and followed, NSF instituted a [streamlined process in 2020 for these disclosures using SciENcv](#).

[DOE Order O 486.1](#) issued June 7, 2019 stated that DOE would take “appropriate actions to prohibit DOE employees and DOE contractor employees, while employed by DOE or performing work under a contract, from the unauthorized transfer of scientific and technical

¹ Dr. Michael D. Griffen, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Memorandum titled [“Actions for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Controlled Information, Key Personnel and Critical Technologies.”](#) dated March 20, 2019.

information to foreign government entities through their participation in foreign government talent recruitment programs of countries designated by DOE as a foreign country of risk.”

KSU Policy on Disclosing Foreign Relationships and Activities

1. *Specific agency and/or solicitation guidelines:* Include all support per the guidelines. NIH and NSF requirements are listed below.
 - a. **NIH:** All financial resources, whether Federal, non-Federal, commercial or institutional, available in direct support of an individual’s research endeavors, including but not limited to research grants, cooperative agreements, contracts, and/or institutional awards. Training awards, prizes, or gifts do not need to be included.
 - b. **NSF:** Current and pending support includes all resources made available to an individual in support of and/or related to all of his/her research efforts, regardless of whether or not they have monetary value. Current and pending support also includes in-kind contributions (such as office/laboratory space, equipment, supplies, employees, students). In-kind contributions not intended for use on the project/proposal being proposed also must be reported. Current and pending support information must be provided for this project, for ongoing projects, and for any proposals currently under consideration from whatever source, irrespective of whether such support is provided through the proposing organization or is provided directly to the individual.
2. *Foreign subrecipient of federally funded research:* A number of agencies have policies governing this, including NIH and NSF:
 - a. **NIH:** Prior approval required. See the definition of foreign component in the NIH Grants Policy Statement. Foreign travel for consultation is not considered a foreign component.
 - b. **NSF:** The primary countries involved in any international activities must be included on the cover sheet of the proposal. See the definition of international activities in the PAPPG. Any proposed funding for a foreign organization must also be noted on the cover sheet.
3. *Disclosing foreign components:*
 - a. identification in a NIH grant application
 - b. listing a non-US performance site
 - c. including foreign relationships and activities in a biosketch

- d. informing your pre-award specialist that the project will involve activities outside of the US or partnerships with international collaborators so that the proposal is appropriately marked.
4. *Participation in a foreign talent program:* Several nations have programs that offer researchers salaries, research funding, lab space, and other incentives. As defined by the DOE in a [January 31, 2019 internal memo](#), “a foreign government talent program is generally defined as any foreign state sponsored attempt to acquire US-funded scientific research through recruitment programs that target scientists, engineers, academics, researchers, and entrepreneurs of all nationalities working or educated in the United States.” **Participation in such a program must be disclosed to federal funding agencies as well as your Dean and/or Associate Dean for Research. In addition, you must disclose your participation in a foreign talent program as part of the annual Conflict of Interest disclosure process in the Cayuse Outside Interests module.**
5. *Foreign consulting and other outside business activities:* All KSU faculty and staff must obtain the university’s permission before engaging in compensated outside activities that are related to their KSU duties, and for any activities that may interfere with their KSU duties. See [KSU’s Conflict of Interest Policy](#).
6. *Significant financial interests:* Please see [KSU’s Financial Conflict of Interest Policy](#).
7. *Compromised accounts or other information security threats:* Contact [KSU’s Office of Cybersecurity](#).
8. *Reporting of inventions and disclosures:* Contact [KSU’s Office of Intellectual Property Development](#).

PI Resources

“Disclosures Scientists Must Make of Foreign Ties,” The Scientist, February 12, 2020;
<https://www.the-scientist.com/news-opinion/opinion--disclosures-scientists-must-make-of-foreign-ties-67097>